
Turning to the issue of maritime security, many will be conscious of various maritime disputes, particularly those relating to china, in the east and south china seas. Indeed, global maritime security issues are a myriad of issues, ranging from traditional security issues such as maritime rights competition, sovereignty disputes over islands and reefs to non-traditional security issues such as terrorism and environmental degradation. In terms of space, today's maritime security is already a stereo-security issue for the catchment, underwater, underwater and seabed. For the convenience of research, we can broadly divide it into four broad areas: marine geo-competition, maritime disputes, global maritime security and deep-sea security. Their direction and trends vary greatly and deserve our attention, and i would like to make a brief introduction and discussion here。
Increased geopolitical competition in the oceans
After the end of the cold war, the traditional maritime rights struggle lost its real foundation and was no longer a matter of concern because of the united states ' one-size-fits-all ocean power. The united states is confident in its maritime force and believes that maritime control is no longer a major problem, and that the focus in the future will be on how to better apply maritime rights to counter threats such as terrorism, failed states and transnational crime in maritime areas and to better support united states military operations on land。
In september 1992, the united states secretary of the navy, the secretary of naval operations and the commander of the marine corps jointly approved and issued a strategic white paper entitled " sea to land — preparing for the 21st century of the united states navy " , which made support for nearshore and land combat its main mission, turning the united states navy's centuries-old mahan tradition (on the sea) centred on the capture of sea-making rights into the from the sea tradition, which focuses on power delivery and land strikes. Until the first decade of the twenty-first century, although the issue of maritime rights remained an important issue for geopolitics and naval strategists, the military strategy of the world's major powers, including the united states, had not made competition for maritime rights or maritime control the primary task of maritime forces。
However, since about 2015, there has been a marked change in the situation and there has been a resurgence of marine geo-competitive behaviour. The biggest variable came from the united states, which, in the face of the development of the military modernization of major powers, such as china and russia, in particular maritime forces, had become increasingly restless and believed that countries such as china and russia would challenge united states control of the oceans。
The american strategic community was shocked that “mahan is back”. The united states military, for its part, directly reflected the renewed emphasis on maritime control in its strategic and operational concepts: in 2015, the maritime forces cooperation strategy for the 21st century, issued jointly by the united states navy, the marines and the coast guard, frequently emphasized maritime control and global access capabilities; in january 2017, the united states surface force command introduced the concept of “re-entry to sea”, formally introducing the concept of “distributive lethality”; and, on 17 may 2017, the united states naval operations department issued a white paper for the future navy, entitled “re-entry to sea”, which rose to the top of the entire navy and required the united states navy to ensure maritime control in the open sea, offshore and near sea areas. The regions in which these concepts are implemented by the united states military are concentrated in the coastal areas adjacent to the eurasian continent, with a focus on the western pacific and the arctic。
This recognition by the united states strategic and military communities is also greatly affecting the united states government's security policy. On 18 december 2017, the trump government published its first national security strategy report, which defined china as a strategic rival and accused china of its intention to replace the united states in the indo-pacific region。
Whether china is willing or unwilling, this united states-sponsored maritime power contest has already begun, and china may be passively leading. There is, in fact, a degree of power competition between china and india in the east and north indian ocean. There are, of course, new features and modalities of today's oceanic geo-competition, where increased competition is less likely to lead to large-scale wars, and where the race against each other is likely to be a strategic interface and strategic consumption, rather than a “final victory” in the marhan era. The focus of maritime rights research today is on how, in the context of new technologies and times, ocean control is different from what it was before. What are the new features of ways and means of achieving ocean control
The issue of maritime disputes enters an intermittent or deadlocked phase
Since the second half of 2016, there has been a marked cooling of global ocean disputes, including in the arctic, antarctica and the south china sea. There are a number of accidental factors, but there are also some underlying reasons。
There are as many as 60 littoral states worldwide with other states in disputes over island sovereignty and over 400 potential maritime boundaries (including exclusive economic zones and continental shelf). At present, less than one third of these problems have been completely resolved, and the rest are hard to resolve and hard bones. Moreover, as information becomes more and more developed and popular participation in public affairs, such as diplomacy, becomes more and more difficult to address。
After more than 40 years of games and shocks since the 1970s, the technological and institutional dividends have been overconsumpted. The technological dividend — the increase in the ability of scientific and technological advances to detect and extract marine resources, and the institutional dividend — and the introduction of a range of maritime regimes represented by the united nations convention on the law of the sea, in particular the rules of the exclusive economic zone, have stimulated coastal states' competition and competition for the oceans and seas。
Since the twenty-first century, the disputing parties have come to an impasse, with their ideas and bottom lines becoming clearer, and what can be done in the context of the prevailing international landscape and the era of peace in general has almost reached its limit, with the marginal effects of large-scale actions being significantly reduced and costs rising sharply. In the future, no major changes have taken place in the international landscape, and in the absence of new major international regime adjustments or the emergence of ocean-subversive technologies, the issue of global ocean disputes will presumably not be as intense as in previous years, with a degree of cooling, but only at a relatively low temperature。
The international landscape, the international ocean regime and technological changes may take longer than we thought, and what is now worse is the potential impact of the fourth technological revolution. However, the technologies that have been described as the core of the fourth technological revolution, such as 3d printing, artificial intelligence and the networking of goods, are integrated applications of existing technologies and are not actually subversive technologies. In other words, technologies that have the potential to change the political landscape of ocean space and oceans have not yet emerged and are still in the gestation and trial stages。
Maritime disputes have a direct impact on international security. In essence, there is a certain contradiction between sovereignty and security, and there is a question of how to balance “stable” with “protect”. The defence of sovereignty and sovereign rights necessarily takes place at the expense of a certain degree of security and diplomatic efforts for the stability of the region concerned, while actions to preserve regional stability and security, while not losing sovereignty, will certainly affect the pace and manner of defence of rights。
Growing prominence of global ocean governance issues
Unlike terrestrial space, ocean space has always been an open system. In low-political sensitive areas, there is a range of non-traditional maritime security issues, including piracy and armed robbery, terrorism, arms proliferation, transnational crime, natural disasters, maritime distress and environmental problems. No one of these types of problems can be solved without the cooperation of the littoral states, and no major power in the world, including the united states, can tackle them alone。
The connectivity and indivisibility of the global oceans determine that the use and management of the oceans are innate and open, and coastal states need to take into account their international responsibilities when exploiting the oceans. Economic globalization, on the other hand, has deepened humankind's dependence on the oceans, and threats to security have transcended national borders and become global problems because of the high degree of ocean connectivity. Addressing piracy and transnational crime, protecting the marine environment and maintaining maritime security are increasingly beyond the capacity of individual states or groups of states。
The oceans are one of the three truly global commons. Whether or not they wish, the governance of the maritime commons imposes on the world's oceanic states, particularly the major powers, the necessary responsibilities and obligations. When it comes to the governance of the maritime commons, while pursuing their power, influence and reputation, the major powers must also raise their flag to preserve the maritime commons. There is no sharp contradiction in the governance of the maritime commons among the major powers, and all major coastal states, including the united states, are fully aware that no state can control the oceans alone. The problem lies in the tragedy of the commons, where the crux of ocean commons governance is the distribution of responsibilities。
At present, the greatest problem facing global ocean governance is the acute undersupply of and demand for public goods. In recent years, global ocean problems have intensified and the need for governance has grown, yet supply has not kept pace and has declined. Most notably, the capacity and interest of the united states in international ocean governance are declining, and emerging countries such as china, despite their will and interest, have significant gaps in capacity and experience. China is ready to contribute actively, within its capabilities, but as president xi has repeatedly stressed, “Global governanceThe system is shared globally and cannot be owned by any single country.”
The issue of governance of global maritime security has undoubtedly become an important issue in global governance. The focus of future theory and practice remains on how to promote cooperation among the global coastal states, particularly among the major powers。
Deep sea safety will be a new subject
The twenty-first century is the century of the oceans, and more precisely the century of the deep sea. The deep sea is defined differently in different industries, ranging from 300 to 1,000 metres deep. With 90 per cent of the world's oceans at depths greater than 1,000 metres and 71 per cent of the earth's total surface area, the area of the deep sea is approximately 65 per cent. So far, only about 5 per cent of human knowledge of ocean space has been recorded, and the remaining unknown space is essentially deep。
Deep sea space is the last space on earth that is not fully and systematically understood and used by humankind, and it is vast and potentially of almost unlimited strategic value. Given that humankind is accelerating its journey to the deep sea, the strategic situation in the deep sea will greatly influence the future international ocean political landscape. Currently, the world's major ocean powers are paying greater attention to and operating the deep sea in terms of economic development, military competition and rule-making. In terms of security, the deep sea is known as the strategic “new frontiers” for the sustainable development of mankind in the twenty-first century, and its vast and deep strategic depths are becoming a strategic high point for the enhanced military presence and control of ocean powers。
Deep-sea security is first and foremost a development and operational security issue. Thanks to the rapid development of marine science and technology, humankind is entering a phase of exploitation of the oceans in all its dimensions, and its exploration and development of the deep sea in particular will soon be substantially breakthroughed. At present, the areas identified as having development value or potential are mainly exploration and exploitation of deep-sea mineral resources, industrialization applications of deep-sea water, deep-sea organisms and genetic industries, exploration and exploitation of deep-sea hydrocarbon resources, etc. Commercialized mining of cobalt-rich crusts, hydrothermal sulphides, polymetallic nodules and flammable ice is expected to continue around 2030. Once developed on a large scale, a range of security issues arise, including operational safety, platform security, environmental security and human security. For humans, the deep sea, while significant, is equally risky. Incidents such as the disappearance of m370 and the loss of connection with the argentine submarine san juan are constantly reminding those who march into the deep sea of the uncertainty and uncertainty of the deep sea。
Deep-sea strategic competition is another security issue that needs urgent attention. For almost two years, the deep sea is becoming a new arena for the ocean powers. Deep-sea space is difficult to detect because of its poor permeability, high pressure and complex hydrological characteristics, and it is easy to achieve the covert nature of military operations and suddenness of attacks, whose military value is being excavated by ocean powers. Unlike “spot strikes” or asymmetric checks and balances, which used to rely mainly on submarines, the networked and systematized features of underwater military competition have become more prominent today。
The development of underwater warfare has benefited from advances in deep sea sensing, communications and engineering. In recent years, the technology of unmanned aerial vehicles (uuvs) has matured, and it is expected that by 2030 the uuv will have been able to carry out tasks such as laying mines, monitoring, transporting weapons and ammunition, and to work with platforms to provide more sensors, weapons capacity and countermeasures in anti-submarine warfare. If uuv were to be used on a large scale, the pattern of underwater warfare would change significantly. The role and role of submarines will change significantly, and its task will no longer be to attack directly, but to direct them to combat, mainly as command and control platforms for uuvs, unmanned sensors and weapons outside the zone. This will be the most revolutionary change in underwater confrontation in the more than 100 years since submarines were born。
(the author is the executive director of the centre for marine strategies at beijing university. The present report is an expanded version of the presentations made by the author at the 17th national security forum of the institute of international relations, “review and prospects of the international security situation 2017”. Press release is authorized










