In the quotations of a book i've edited (thinking through metaphorical thinking through translation with m)Etaphors, 2010), i said: lakoff and johnson on linguistics and black and ortony on scientific history should warn us, metaphorically (m)There are ways (and often so) to pre-empt, or even pre-empt, the way we define (conseptualize) translation. To what extent, in your opinion, do you define the possible boundaries between translation and intellectual research? For the following options, i. E., modes of communication (transmission), modes of transport (transportative), modes of commerce (dissemination/exchange), modes of industry (production) and modes of religion (creation) - if we see the creation of the world in the bible story as the original text, as we think of the word "creation" in english today, which is the most useful? And how do you see some of the terms that you yourself have used — in particular, “interlingual practice” and “exchange code” — in the process of becoming involved in the role envisaged for translation, not only in china or east asia, but also more generally
Liu wah: looking back on the subject of translation that i discussed, i almost never used the terms “transmit” or “transmit” unless they were the object of criticism. I prefer “production” and “circulation”, and in fact, in order to analyse translation practices in global circulation, i have deliberately placed the word “circulation” in the subtitle of the exchange code (1999)。
You bring up the history of science and technology and see them as examples where knowledge or expertise is often seen as transferable or transferable. That's a term we've seen almost everywhere, isn't it? Is it because one perceives the process itself as a metaphor, or does it have to rely on the metaphor of “transmitting” or “transmitting”? The latin word frequently referred to as "translatio", meaning "carrying over" or "transmitting" (the sacred object), has in fact reflected the duality of this metaphor (m)I'm not sure if i'm going to do this. However, if the word “translation” itself is left out, and if some languages happen not to be the source of the latin word, then the concept of “translation” (co) is only from the source of the latin wordDoes this work
The next question is, even if we look at non-european languages, how do we know that we are not once again caught in a futile semantic exercise through translation? When we look at the concept of “translation” in non-european languages, what we see in our eyes may be something that we already know well and have been translated, don't we? Finally, can it exhaust the meaning of the concept of “translation” under semantic exercises in multiple linguistic domains? These questions remind us that we need to first maintain the philosophical distinction between “concepts” and “words”。
I think the questions you're asking include a series of cross-cutting topics: translation, knowledge, metaphors, etc. It might be easier for me to deal with them in their entirety. I think that the relevance of your question is not so much a term as an ineligibility (slippage) of movement between a fairly common concept; the ineligibility of such movement leads to a series of interrelated and interesting questions. Even though the uncertainty and inevitability of the movement of concepts is widespread, i would suggest that we conduct an experiment of thought, the starting point of which is to treat translation as a concept of historical provisions, to examine how the concept of translation has been formed in the established tradition of discourse, and what its boundaries are, such as the intertwining of “translable” and “untranslable”, which can be traced back to the theory and practice of translation. Does our intellectual experiment also apply to the conceptual variation of translationI'm not sure if it's a good idea. The answer is yes, because no concept can exist alone or independently of a particular discourse tradition. We can only distinguish between concepts in specific language traditions。
Back to exchange codes, which i wrote in the late 1990s (1999). I wrote in the book's preface that, in the concept of translation, translation and non-translation are often in the form of struggles — in the form of words that are removed to school. In fact, the real struggle took place between the languages that existed in history and focused on the interaction between language and its “value of meaning”. In this book, i mainly ask the following questions: first, how do the historical experiences of different cultures (including conquest) produce or resist the interaction between their languages of “values of meaning”? (note that the terms “production” and “resistance” are used here in the sense of fukko's knowledge production, not in the sense of industrial production.) second, how can we think about the so-called equivalence between words when the unequal form that dominates global exchange is the material framework of “value of meaning” exchange
In recent years, i have further elaborated on these reflections, focusing on the management of reciprocal logic. In any case, the logic of “x = y” is indispensable to the concept of translation, and the same logic controls the inner structure of the metaphor. However, here i would like to ask a deeper question: how can the logic of reciprocity between words create an unequal relationship while hiding it? It is precisely by relying on translation that a “reciprocity” occurs between the semantics of different languages, but what is behind the semantic “reciprocity”? I think this question is more difficult than the questions i have raised in my previous writings, but i can try to answer them. After all, people are always comparing things and translating them. If we have sufficient time, we can go further on the relationship between comparative and translation behaviour。
Tokens of exchange (1999) cover
In any case, i have always believed that creative participation in translation research requires a new conceptual framework, because the difficulty of translation is not only a matter of linguistic, literary, philosophical or cultural anthropological research, but also transcends other disciplines and fields. For example, as i have already shown in the freudian robot, 2010, the concept of “translation”, which has been used to define dna and rna biochemical processes, is widely present in molecular biology and seems unproblematic, but never sufficiently theoretical. The variability of metaphors that exist at the disposal of scientists and social scientists goes far beyond the ability to clearly distinguish the concept of translation, let alone to suggest a method of analysing transdisciplinary translation. In short, there is something more at stake in this discussion than the complication and negligibility of the language in translation — in international politics, the stakes can only increase as states compete on multiple fronts (including those of translators)。
But there is still a long way to go for theoretical innovation, and for the time being, there are many obstacles to translation research, including some of the most likely connections to translation in our minds, such as the transfer of words, the communication of information, and whether there is a connection between languages or not. Among them, we look at two obstacles you have mentioned in your question: (1) the mode of communication of the translation; and (2) theology's model — the “religious model” of the translation you call it。
What's wrong with these patterns? The first model, which views language as a tool of communication, implies a instrumentalist, distorted and infertile language. The second model, which insists on the adequacy of semantics in translation, is as if the semantics of different languages were satisfied or semantics were absent - the only thing that could happen in the translation. For many years, the area of translation research has remained largely in the shadow of these models. Here, the statements about translationability and non-translability are old, re-emerging and without innovation. To be honest, i think that this type of model is very disappointing and ill-informed. In the works translinguual practice, 1995 and the clash of empires, 2014 and in a recent article, “translation is also an event” (the eventfulness of transport, 2014), i have criticized the persistence of these models at the philosophical, linguistic, theological and cultural anthropological levels, which are premised on the centrality of marcus. Likewise, we see that in the mode of interaction and theology of translation theory, the charades that center on the jugos are still with us today; they have long focused on translationability and non-translability and on the transmission and transmission functions of translation, which is the language tradition built by translation research。
André: your answer leads to a few interesting questions that i would like to briefly respond to before asking the next question. First of all, i clearly agree with you that “in today's world we should not allow the way we use concepts to be defined by the source of words”. This is particularly true of the term “translation”, which we are discussing. Even worse, we need to look at the context of the word so that we can see when and where it affects our use of the term. In an article that i have just finished, i have discussed the origins of the term “translation” and its broad equivalents in different languages, as well as many of the more general metaphors of translation, which give rise to a predisposition that interprets more isolated than cooperative behaviour. It's just an example. I believe that the burden of historically transmitted usage has been placed on us in many ways; we need long-term vigilance. Your subsequent comments on patterns of interaction and theology are also a good example。
Your question about reciprocity (“how does the logic of reciprocity between words create an unequal relationship while hiding it?”) is also very attractive to many and a reflection on the basic elements of the concept of translation. Although some recent translation studies have argued that “we need to go beyond reciprocity”, i'm not sure that such attempts have been successful. Apart from the limited places that need to be rewritten and recreated; as soon as we begin to talk about translation appropriately, reciprocity always exists in various ways。
Your problem seems to be fokko-like in a sense, because talking about inequality inevitably brings to mind the question of power, and the discussion about it is certainly post-colonialThis is an important contribution to translation. In theory, when it comes to people, languages and cultures, one should be able to speak of inequality in practice rather than in value judgement — this concept seems to have become intertwined in dealing with such topics. The issue of “who are the authors of the original dictionary and comparative grammar” is therefore crucial. In this connection, the case of china, where the jesuits who first arrived in china and the businessmen and protestant missionaries later began to deal with the matter, began with the assumption that the han language was the subject of a rule by its own language, which often appeared to be “defect”. I'm talking about du halde and other early writers in chinese: no matter how these writers compare the chinese language to the european language, they almost always leave the difference between the two on some kind of “lack” of the chinese language, such as “lack of voice”, “lack of modernity”, “lack of grammar”, “lack of modern” terminology, etc. (see translation of china)
Translating china
I don't know。
Returning to your desire to express the concept of cross-linguistic practice as an “extrication from reciprocity”, to what extent do you believe that your intervention in this regard has been successful? In other words, do you think that translation studies as an area have accepted those ideas? And/or, what do you think about others' attempts to “exceed reciprocity” — something we can seem to hear from time to time? If “reciprocity logic makes the structures of inequality both possible and hidden”, does this mean that there are vested interests that resist such “extrication” (or “excessing”) or that there is dissimilar and implicit resistance to this idea
Liu shau: thank you for asking these questions and for giving me the opportunity to further develop some of the topics that are more relevant in translation practice and theory, both in the temporal-spatial event and in its irreversible impact on the language in question. Before entering into the main point of view, i should confess that i am not particularly interested in translation studies per se. In fact, if the interpreter does not force me to notice with his powerful ethical, social, political force, or — how to say — if translation is not a spiritual source of direct language towards social or political life, it may not at all attract my attention. For example, i have repeatedly mentioned the case of the chinese-british bilingual treaty of the opium war, which is precisely an indication of the temporal and spatial dynamics of translation and its irreversible impact on language. I assume that there is a similar pattern in the diplomatic exchanges between the ottoman empire and the british empire, but the lack of arabic is preventing me from establishing meaningful links with the work of historians in this part of the world. I had no choice but to limit my example to east asia, hoping that other scholars would build further links。
In the process of british colonization of asia, “who is the fury?” the answer to this question seems clear, but not necessarily. It is full of cognitive cracks and difficulties, some of which stem from the “reversibility” of the voice of the subject - in the words of the hierarchy of civilization that we know well, it is almost inevitable that the victims need to see themselves through the mirror of the other. In practical terms, this reversal has led to a doubling of the meaning of the terminus, which has eventually shattered the cognition and produced things like english barbarian in east asian languages. This is exactly what happened during the opium war。
Reread the treaty of tianjin between china and the united kingdom of great britain and northern ireland of 1858, which we must necessarily see in paragraph 51:
Subsequent correspondence, whether outside kyoto or outside kyoto, between the british and the british, may not be spelled out。
It is above that, henceforward, the caracter's "i."
Barbarian
Shall not be applied to the government or subjects of her britannic majesty in any chinese official dI don't know, i don't know
I emphasize in italics the line above, as it is written in the original english version. This is a triple symbol chain: the roman letter “i” reproduces the voice or pronunciation of the chinese word, while the writing of the word “sharp” is combined with its english equivalent, the bracketed “barbarian”. The roman letters of the pronunciation, the chronology, and the bracketed english words, which are the originals and which are the translations
Paragraph 51 of the treaty of tianjin
The answer appears to be given in paragraph 50 of the treaty. In order to prevent ambiguity, the british authorities have pre-emptively inserted section 50 before the word razed, as follows:
The english texts are then in english and are still in chinese for the time being, and chinese students have chosen to learn english and english, i. E. Not chinese. From now on, where words are debated, english is always used as justice. This is the case for the han and the english texts。
It is indeed that, in the event of there being any possibility of meaning between the english and chinese text, the english government will hold the sense as exhausted in the english text
The last line, in italics, emphasizes that the chinese word “sharp” in paragraph 51 must be translated into english and “detailed and unrepressed” to become the legal semantic。
So what's the original and what's the translation? How does the interpreter distinguish himself from the other party? Wouldn't it be strange if the english word “barbarian” in paragraph 51 of the treaty of tianjin was the original language to be used in the selection of all translations, but it was also the chinese translation of “sharp” in the text? Because it provided for both the original and the translation of the english word, it then formed a complete semantic closed ring that made the word “sharp” impossible to escape. It is not a question (is it a choice?) that we have to start with this closed circle, but rather a synonym between the two terms, how and why。
In the series of events leading to the opium war, british officials first claimed that the chinese called foreigners “barbarian” — although we were quite certain that the mandarin and (other) chinese did not speak english, but referred to british and other foreigners in their own words as “i”. The british mastered the meaning of “share” through their own translation and personal hearing of the word “barbarian”. The qing dynasty officials were not proud of the low self-esteem of the british. Instead, they were puzzled by the fact that the word “sharp” was offensive to the other side, and they tried to convince the british that it was not what they thought it meant. This controversy is no small matter, because the legal ban imposed by paragraph 51 of the tianjin treaty is the source of the so-called “exclusionist psychology of the chinese”, a story that has been circulating in our history textbooks。
The bracketed english word “barbarian” in the ban ensures the semantic stability and reliability of the translation of the word “sharp” in the treaty of tianjin in china and the united kingdom. This bilingual (bilateral) treaty compels qing dynasty officials to submit to the authority of the original english language and to receive the word “correct” in the sense of “raze” or even any other chinese word. However, the english language has proved to be by no means unique in its meaning, since there must be a prior “intent” that has been extinguished or invalidated by a new meaning before the process of acquiring authority begins. More than a hundred years before the opium war, the british east india company in guangzhou had, in most official documents, equated han with another english word, “foreign” (foreign), until the early 1930s, when the first protestant missionary to china, robert morrison, compiled and published a bilingual dictio in 1815-1823This term was included in the text. However, on the eve of the first opium war, foreign's words suddenly became irrelevant and were replaced by barbarian。
In a study of the empire's word politics (2004), i recorded the change in the chinese word “sharp” fromforeign to barbarian in english translation, when a new concept was invented to analyse how the semantics of foreign languages appeared in the national language through translation, and the new concept i used was “finger symbol”. I have worked for more than two decades to get rid of problems such as interpretability or non-translation. This does not mean that the question of equivalence has disappeared from my study. On the contrary, from the point of view of the symbol, the question of equivalence in translation has become more of an issue for discussion。
Let me explain what i'm talking about: in any known language, the symbol refers not to the existing words, but to a different chain of meaning (heterolinguistic signature chain); by translation, it cuts across the semantic domain of two or more languages, like “i”
Barbarian
The situation. In my study of the negotiation of bilingual treaties, i found the concept to be effective, because it leaves behind the premise of semantic equivalence between different languages and allows analysts to find links between the basic elements of different languages through the dynamic process of translation, which is always invisible. We see that paragraph 51 of the treaty of tianjin imposes a ban on the chinese word “sharp” precisely by authorizing such a symbol, even though it never meant to do so: it combines a graphic mix of things, i. E. “i” + “sharp” as the original english “barbarian”. As evidence of its success, the ban has since removed the word “sharp” from the semantic circulation chain. This chinese word has been buried and is no longer a part of chinese life; it is a dead word, as people see in dictionaries or archives。
It may be countered that paragraph 51 of the treaty of tianjin is an extreme example, and certainly there are other examples of translation that reflect more harmonious relations than coercion. Yes, i also believe in world peace, but i understand better that war is not far away from peace. If the logic of reciprocity does exist and cannot be removed, then a few more examples, or a few fewer, will not shake the effectiveness of the logic itself. So i'm going to analyse specifically what the logic of reciprocity is, focusing on three main points。
First, we may wish to treat the logic of reciprocity as a priori conceptual dimension. When each translator begins to work on translation, there is no other option but to dictate the different languages he/she faces in translation, based on the logic of reciprocity — i. E. X in a and y in b or not. Even if it is claimed that translation is not possible, this assertion can only be made if the logic of reciprocity is accepted in advance. I've been trying to put forward a philosophical proposition in my book: reciprocity is a a priori context in which it creates equivalence or disequilibria between and among things in repeated and endless movements, and thus gives rise to so-called “same” and “differentties”. This does not mean that there is a natural symmetry or a mismatch between languages, but rather that when people judge in translation what is legible and what is not, they are driven by that logic。
Context of the tianjin treaty
In short, in the face of the diversity of language systems, people need to know what is accessible and what is not. It is often customary to attribute everything to the similarities and differences that exist between different languages, as i have said: if we do not compare or translate between language and language, and if we do not compare or translate according to the logic of reciprocity, how can we distinguish between the same language and the difference
This leads to my next main argument: the logic of reciprocity is either marked or not. In mathematics, this logic is always marked by the strange symbols invented by mathematicians. In mathematics, the really important symbol is not a value, but an equation, a function and other operational symbols. When mathematicians say that x and y are in a reciprocal relationship at the actual assembly, what are they saying? Or may i ask, what are mathematicians doing? They're actually manipulating "=,"
