In the 1990s, when russia had just recovered from the collapse of the soviet union, and the economy had collapsed, they held a great deal of sophisticated arms in their hands, but the domestic market could not digest them, and they had to export for foreign exchange. The chinese air force was in dire need of upgrades at the time, and the main force was the old second-generation machine, which suffered a clear loss in the face of the pressure on the perimeter。
When the two countries combined, they finalized the sioux-30 military sales contract, which appeared to be a win-win business, with russia making a quick profit and china filling the air slot. But for several years, some russian experts began to murmur, selling them too quickly, making $4 billion, but in the long run, they lost money。
With these technologies, china has quickly created its own warplanes, not only not to buy russians, but also to find jobs on the international market. Russia's potential orders flew at least $20 billion, and it made many russians regret it。
Russia’s military sales choice in the low economy
After the collapse of the soviet union, the russian defence industrial system nearly collapsed, the financial chain was broken, the brain drain was drained and the factory order fell sharply. In the early 1990s, western sanctions, coupled with low oil prices, had worsened the russian economy by selling oil, gas and weapons. Arms exports have become a source of foreign exchange, with india and china being the largest buyers。
The chinese air force was under-equipped at that time, and the main warplanes, f-15 and f-16, performed far less well than the united states. In the aftermath of the 1996 crisis in the taiwan strait, china was aware of the gaps in its ability to strike at the sea and urgently needed to introduce multi-purpose warplanes。
Russia has just seized the opportunity that su-30, as an upgraded version of su-27, is highly mobile, has a long way to travel and can hang a wide range of precision weapons to meet china's needs。
In 1999, the first group of 38 su-30mkk was delivered at a unit cost of approximately $40 million. This was followed by the second batch of 38 in 2001 and the third batch of 24 su-30mk2 in 2003, for a total of 100, with a total contract value of $4 billion. This money is a timely rain for russia, helping to maintain the operation of the sokhoy design agency and the irkutsk plant and to avoid the collapse of many enterprises。
At that time, the russian side felt that the sale would be profitable and that china, as a major customer, might also depend on imports for a long time. But they didn't expect china to introduce technology, not just finished products. The su-30 navigational power system, vector thrust engines and multi-purpose designs have become valuable references for chinese military workers。
Russian experts later admitted in the media that they had underestimated the speed of china’s digestive capacity and thought that the technical barriers were high enough, and that after a few years, they had seen china’s fighter jets quenching and even overloading。
China's aviation industry has moved from dependence to self-reliance
When china took su-30, it did not stop at simple use, but simultaneously advanced technology absorption and domestication. The shenyang aircraft industry group has accumulated experience in the design of heavy war planes by studying the structure, engine and radar of su-30。
The al-31f engine was an advanced world at the time, providing a model for the development of a chinese vortex engine. The chinese engineers gradually replaced the components, replaced the passive radar with a nationally produced active phase control array, integrated the beidou navigation, and enhanced their posture perception。
The multi-purpose concept of su-30, which directly affected the birth of sioux-16, was the first flight in 2011, with a double-seat layout and a mounted capacity of 12 tons, which was more integrated than russia's su-30sm。
As far back as 1998, the first flight of shape-11 was successful, followed by the replacement of 11b with a national-made radar and missile, free of dependence on russia. Following the delivery of the last su-30 in 2004, china no longer procured russian-made aircraft on a large scale, focusing on 10c, 16 and 20. These national machines produce over 100 units per year, well above the russian capacity of 20。
China has also exported warlords and seized russian shares in traditional markets such as pakistan and myanmar. India bought 272 su-30mkis at a unit cost of $120 million, while costs of assault-16 were down to $80 million, at a higher value。
Russia's su-30sm also uses passive radar, with a distance of 50 kilometres and a range of 200 kilometres from the chinese thunder-15 missile, which has become an early warning aircraft. This shift has left the russians stupid enough to think that china will be a long-term buyer, and who knows that the path to indigenization goes beyond that。
Russian talent and experience have also been absorbed by china, which, through joint projects, has mastered the design process and even attracted some russian experts to participate in projects in china. From the introduction of su-27 in the early 1990s to military service in the 2010s, the chinese aviation industry made a leap from catching up to running。
Retrospection and loss of military strategy by russian experts
Russian experts then reflected that the soviet-30 deal was a strategic error. In his interview, well-known aviation analysts, such as konstantin makienko, stated that the export of the su-27 production line to china had led to the sale of at least 500 fewer fighters, which was compounded by the transfer of technology from su-30。
The russian side accounted for $4 billion, but after china's rise russia lost $20 billion in potential orders. The technology is anti-squeezing the market, and china no longer buys russian machines, and has introduced cheaper domestic equipment to compete directly。
The low production capacity in russia makes it difficult to keep pace with chinese “low dumpling” production. The russian side thought that china would rely only on imports, but did not expect china to focus on long-term accumulation. In the asia-pacific region, russian military technology has weakened and chinese warplanes have exported to more countries。
Russian media reports indicate that experts have acknowledged a lack of long-term vision and that short-term economic gains have led to long-term risks. Exports such as su-35 are also a source of concern, with china buying 24 su-35s in 2015. Russia would have sold more and even mentioned authorized production, but china refused and turned to self-study。
Russian experts pointed out that, through these transactions, china had decrypted core russian technology, such as air and electricity compatibility and missile integration. Market squeezes were evident, with countries such as india turning to diversified procurement and russia's share shrinking. The experts did not deny that economic pressure had been high, but stressed the need for military sales to balance returns and risks。
The russian defence industry today faces sanctions and war effects, and exports are more difficult, and experts call for a careful assessment of technology transfer to avoid a repetition of the past. This reflection is not rhetorical, but is based on data comparisons, such as changes in performance parameters and sales。
From the trade between china and russia - 30, the military trade is not simply a trade, but a flow of technology and strategic games. In the short term, russia has lifted the economic emergency, but has lost market dominance in the long run. China, for its part, has demonstrated the need for technological self-reliance through the introduction of accumulation and the establishment of an autonomous system。
The regret of the russian experts, on the other hand, confirms the correctness of the chinese path, from dependence in the 1990s to the steady pace of 20-year-olds today. China and russia may continue to cooperate in the future, but the form will change, russia will need to be alert to the skills drain and china will focus more on the original。
This history is not about winning and losing, but rather about comparing the development strategies of the two countries. Russia is short-term and china is long-term. As we look to the future, russian military needs are transformed and chinese aviation continues to move forward, the old bill has become a valuable experience。
