In the 1990s, the international landscape changed. Russia, which had just inherited the soviet military legacy, was mired in an economic downturn; at the same time, the chinese air force was facing severe equipment disruption. At that time, the main aircraft of the chinese air force remained at the level of second-generation fighter jets, such as shaft-7, shaft-8, which were at an absolute disadvantage when faced with third-generation advanced united states military aircraft, such as f-15, f-16 and others。
The need for modern fighter jets has become particularly urgent following the outbreak of the taiwan strait crisis in 1996, especially with regard to the urgent need to fill the gap in the capability to strike the sea with precision. At a time when russia is in an unprecedented state of difficulty as a result of the post-soviet economic collapse, foreign exchange earnings are urgently needed to sustain the functioning of the country, with arms exports becoming its vital economic pillar. The special needs of this special period have led to intensive cooperation between china and russia in the field of military equipment。
After many rounds of negotiations, china eventually imported 76 su-30mk and 24 su-30mk2 fighters from russia at very competitive prices — around $40 million each — a large purchase order of up to $4 billion, which became the focus of the international arms market at that time. This deal not only addressed the immediate needs of the chinese air force, but also injected valuable funds into the russian economy。
The collapse of the soviet union caused a devastating blow to the russian defence industrial system. The once brilliant military-industrial complex faced multiple dilemmas such as the break-up of its financial chain, the loss of its core technical skills and the collapse of military orders, and many well-known design bureaux and military factories were cut off or semi-cut off. At the same time, russia’s economy has been made worse by the continued economic sanctions imposed by western countries, and the continuing decline in international crude oil prices has plunged the russian economy, which is heavily dependent on energy exports, into a vicious circle。
Against this background, arms exports have become an important pillar of russia's economic viability. In addition to traditional oil and gas exports, the arms trade has gradually become the main source of russian foreign exchange earnings. India and china, two large asian countries, with their huge defence needs and relatively abundant foreign exchange reserves, have gradually become major buyers of russian arms, providing valuable space for russian military-industrial enterprises。
The chinese air force was clearly lagging behind the world's advanced level of equipment at that time. Since the beginning of the 1990s, china has been embarking on the process of modernizing its air force, starting with the introduction from russia of the su-27 series of fighters, followed by the gradual upgrading of the acquisition of more advanced su-30 series. In addition to increasing the operational capability of the chinese air force, the introduction of these warplanes has provided valuable learning samples for the development of the chinese aviation industry。
Although these military sales orders have generated significant foreign exchange earnings for russia, they have been deeply regretted by a number of russian military experts and strategic analysts since then. It was generally felt that, while considerable economic gains had been made in the short term, in the long term, those transactions had deprived russia of greater market space and technological advantages。
The su-30 fighter jets are the fourth generation of air-oriented fighters developed during the soviet era and are known for their excellent mobility, their long range and their powerful weapon-mounting capabilities. During the 1991 gulf war, the multi-purpose combat capability demonstrated by the united states f-15e fighter bombers inspired national air forces and made the russian military aware of the need to modernize and upgrade existing aircraft。
Su-30 is a three-and-a-half-generation multi-purpose fighter jet developed on the basis of the su-27ub double coaches, developed and developed by the well-known sohoy design bureau. The aircraft, equipped with the state-of-the-art air power system and vector thrust engine at the time, was capable of carrying a variety of precision-guided weapons, particularly suitable for ground-to-ground and sea-to-sea missions, perfect for the operational requirements of the chinese air force。
However, the strategic importance of china's introduction of the su-30s goes far beyond increasing air force capability. More importantly, these imported warplanes provide chinese military-industrial enterprises with an excellent opportunity to study the layout of advanced russian-military aircraft structures, design concepts, on-board systems, air power equipment and engine technology, and provide china with a solid basis for autonomous development of advanced fighter aircraft. The shenyang aircraft industries group has studied in depth the key areas of the overall aerodynamic layout, engine systems and radar technology of heavy combat aircraft through technological introduction and absorption。
The al-31f vortex engine, equipped with su-30, represents an advanced level of the world's aviation engine, and its reliability and performance parameters provide an important reference for the development of chinese domestic aviation engines. In conjunction with the introduction of su-30, china has simultaneously promoted technology digestion. Through system reverse engineering research, chinese engineers have succeeded in decrypting the structure of the su-30 air power system and achieving perfect compatibility with nationally produced missiles, such as the thunder-12 medium-range air missile, the eagle strike-91 anti-radiation missile。
Chinese engineers have made a number of indigenous improvements to the imported su-30: the replacement of the old passive mechanical scanning radar with a nationally produced active phase control radar, and the integration of the beidou satellite navigation system have significantly improved the aircraft's situational awareness and operational effectiveness. These improvements have not only enhanced the performance of active aircraft, but have accumulated valuable experience in the development of more follow-on domestic-made aircraft。
The multi-purpose design concept of su-30 directly led to the birth of a national anti-aircraft aircraft of 16, which, in terms of mounted capacity (up to 12 tons), navigational power systems and integrated capabilities, has outpaced russian active s-30sm. On the basis of the full absorption of su-30 technology, the chinese aviation industry has developed successive sets of 11th series of fighters. The successful first flight in 1998 was followed by the complete replacement of the national-made radar and missile systems with the modified 11b and the autonomous control of key systems。
This is the deep, nationalized version of su-30, which completed its first flight in 2011. The machine is based on two-seat configurations, has a strong weapon-mounted capability, is equipped with advanced active phase-control radars and domestically produced navigational power systems, and has overall state-of-the-art performance. The russian military and engineering community is even more troubled by the fact that china is quickly "defunct" after having fully mastered the technology: since the last delivery of su-30 in 2004, china has no longer procured large-scale russian-made major aircraft。
China's aviation industry has turned its efforts towards the development of national production, such as the 10c, the 16th and the 5th generation of invisible warplanes, and has even begun to introduce foreign trade models such as "oxl" to international markets, gradually taking over russia's traditional arms market. This shift has enabled russian military experts to begin to reflect deeply on the military sales policy of the year。
In an interview with the media, the well-known airline analyst yooning stated that the export of the su-27 production line to china had led to a reduction in the sale of at least 500 russian warplanes, and that the transfer of technology by su-30 was a major strategic error. Russian experts have calculated in detail that, while the su-30 deal has brought short-term gains of $4 billion, the rise of the chinese aviation industry has deprived russia of at least $20 billion in potential orders。
In the case of india, for example, the purchase of 272 su-30mkis at a unit price of $120 million, while china, through domesticization, has kept the cost of destruction-16 at around $80 million, completely depriving russian warplanes of their comparative advantage. Even more embarrassing is the technical contrast: russian-made s-30sm is still using old-style passive phase-control radar, while china's scavenger-16 is equipped with more advanced active phase-control radar, with a detection distance of 50 kilometres than russian-made radar; russian-made r-77 medium-range air-range missiles have a range of only 80 kilometres, while china's self-developed long-range aerial missile has a range of 200 kilometres, known by the west as the "early warning machine killer"; and, in terms of production capacity, russia has less than 20 machines per year, while china's jab-16 can produce more than 100 \ "snil" per year。
The deep-seated reasons why russian experts feel so sorry are three-fold: first, china’s rapid counter-squeezing of technology has squeezed russia’s follow-on market space. After fully digesting su-30 technology, china has not only stopped buying russian-made war planes on a large scale, but has also begun to introduce more expensive domestic equipment on the international market, directly becoming russia’s strong rival。
The second is the "reverse absorption" effect of talent and technological experience. In the long-term cooperation, the chinese aviation team has achieved a rapid upgrading of technological capabilities through joint research and development, troubleshooting, etc., and systematic mastery of russian design concepts and technical thinking。
Finally, there is a major russian error in strategic judgement. The russian side thought that china would long be dependent on russian-made arms imports, but did not expect china to follow an autonomous development path that "incorporate-incorporate-innovation-exceed." this strategic miscalculation has led to the rapid erosion of russia's military-technical influence in the asia-pacific region and the gradual erosion of its traditional arms market share by chinese products。
Behind this seemingly win-win military-trade cooperation is a completely different development strategy between china and russia. At that time, russia urgently needed short-term economic gains to mitigate the domestic crisis, while china focused on long-term technological accumulation and systemic upgrading of autonomous innovation capabilities. This difference in strategic orientation ultimately led to a marked fragmentation of the trajectory of the development of aviation industries in both countries。
From a more macro-historic perspective, the history of russian military technical cooperation gives us a vivid lesson in technological development: a country’s true core competitiveness lies not in the number of ready-made products sold, but in its ability to continue to lead the direction of technological development and to firmly master future technological evolution. The remorse and reflection of russian experts are precisely proof of the correctness of china's choice of an autonomous and innovative development path for the airline industry. From its initial introduction to its current autonomous innovation, from technological followers to field leaders, this challenging path of development has been followed by chinese airmen who have taken firm and firm steps to achieve a historic leap。
